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Abstract. We argue that Koch’s postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of 
causation, in the sense described in Woodward (2003).  We show how this treatment helps to resolve interpretive puzzles associated with Koch’s work and how it clarifies the different roles the 
postulates play in providing useful, yet not universal criteria for disease causation.  Our paper is an effort at rational reconstruction; we attempt to show how Koch’s postulates and reasoning make 
sense and are normatively justified within an interventionist framework and more difficult to 
understand within alternative frameworks for thinking about causation. 
 
1 Introduction. Koch’s criteria for disease causation, commonly referred to as ǲKoch’s postulates,ǳ 
are often considered the first reliable method for establishing that a contagion is the cause of a 
disease. While Koch developed these criteria in the latter half of the 19th-century, they continue to 
receive significant attention. Koch’s postulates are mentioned in nearly all beginning microbiology 
textbooks and they continue to be viewed as an important standard for establishing causal 
relationships in biomedicine  )n the secondary literature, Koch’s postulates are commonly represented in the following three-
part form:1 
1. The contagion occurs in every case of the disease. 
2. The contagion does not occur in other diseases or non-pathogenically. 
3. After being fully isolated and repeatedly grown in pure culture the contagion can induce the 
disease by being introduced into a healthy animal. 
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1 (Carter 1987b; Evans 1976; Falkow 2004; Fredericks and Relman 1996, xviii). In correspondence, 
Carter has drawn our attention to his discussion on p. 136 of his (2003) in which he describes Koch’s ͳͺͺͶ paper on tuberculosis as containing the most complete description of Koch’s postulates. From this paper Carter extracts five ǲstepsǳ which he takes Koch to advocate for ǲproving causation.ǳ  Four of these steps ȋlabeled Rtͳ, ʹ, Ͷ, and ͷȌ largely coincide with the three 
postulates cited above, but one (Rt3) (ǲThe distribution of organisms must correlate with and explain the disease phenomenonǳȌ goes beyond ͳ-3 above. We focus on 1-3 because these are the 
most common form in which   Koch discusses his criteria   and also the most common form in which 
his postulates are discussed in the secondary literature.     
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Other formulations split the third postulate into two (Grimes 2006; Schaffner 2009) or add a final 
postulate requiring that the contagion be re-isolated from the diseased animal model and grown 
again in pure culture (Engelkirk, Duben-Engelkirk, and Wilson Burton 2011; Hogg 2013). Formulating a version of Koch’s postulates that reflects what he actually says is complicated by 
the fact that Koch rarely discusses his causal criteria explicitly and, when he does, they are not 
stated as generally or clearly as the postulates ascribed to him today.2 ,3  These features partly 
explain why there are so many different formulations of his postulates in the secondary literature 
and why those who analyze his criteria rarely cite his original publications (Carter 1985, 353). In 
our view, Koch’s criteria are best understood though his detailed discussion of specific laboratory 
techniques, and experimental results, on which he relies to argue for causality.   
  Most scholars interpret Koch’s postulates within a framework in which causal claims are 
understood as claims about necessary and sufficient conditions. This is the interpretation favored 
by K. Codell Carter, considered the ǲforemost authorityǳ in this area (Gradmann 2009, 83), and most 
other historians and philosophers (Broadbent 2009; Smith 2001; Smith 2007). Within this 
approach, the first postulate is equated with the claim that the contagion is necessary for the 
disease, and the second and third with the claim that the contagion is sufficient for the disease.4 In 
Carter’s formulation, ǲ[a] phenomenon C is necessary for a phenomenon E if the nonoccurrence of C 
ensures the nonoccurrence of Eǳ and ǲa phenomenon C is sufficient for a phenomenon E if the 
occurrence of C ensures the occurrence of Eǳ (Carter 1985, 353-4)5. Carter uses this framework to analyze Koch’s causal criteria throughout his publications and to argue that Koch relies on different 
criteria at different points in his work (Carter 1985, 354). He claims that Koch’s early work begins 
with a conception according to which causation requires that the contagion is necessary for the 
disease and only later introduces the requirement that the contagion must also be sufficient.  
According to Carter, Koch relies on both necessity and sufficiency as criteria for causation in his 
                                                             
2 )n fact, the designation of these criteria as ǲpostulatesǳ did not originate with Koch himself, but 
with his student Friedrich Loeffler (Gradmann 2009, 3, 238; Gradmann 2008, 219; Brock 1988, 
180-181; Loeffler ͳͺͺͶȌ. )n this paper, we refer to Koch’s causal criteria as ǲKoch’s postulates,ǳ as 
is common in discussions of his work, despite the fact that he did not use this terminology. 
3 The fact that Koch rarely provides explicit discussion of his criteria has led some to claim that his publications contain ǲno original referenceǳ for our modern day understanding of Koch’s postulates and even that ǲKoch himself phrased no such postulatesǳ (Gradmann 2008, 218). 
4 (Carter 1987b, xviii; Smith 2007, 95-96; Smith 2001, 21).  
5  )n his ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ Carter argues that causation is a ǲtheoreticalǳ notion and that ǲin the absence of an accepted theory no amount of empirical evidence can demonstrate causal relationsǳ ȋp.ͳͻ͸Ȍ.  (e takes this to be Koch’s view as well. Carter informs us (personal correspondence) that on this basis 
that he would reject any necessary and sufficient condition conception of causation as 
philosophically inadequate. He also holds that Koch is not committed to such a conception. We are 
not sure how to reconcile these remarks with the passages quoted above.  In any case, as observed above, a number of other writers do hold interpretations of Koch’s postulates in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. The general issue of whether (apart from what Koch may have thought) causation is a ǲtheoreticalǳ or ǲnon-empiricalǳ notion ȋor whether this contrast a fruitful oneȌ is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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mid-to-late ͳͺͺͲ’s publications and this is where we first see the ǲcriteria we now know as Koch’s 
Postulatesǳ (Carter 2003, 134).   
This common interpretation raises a number of puzzles. First, if Koch relies on different causal 
criteria throughout his work, why does he often state that he has used the same method 
throughout, which he claims to have introduced in his first publication on disease causation? 
Second, if Koch’s postulates amount to requiring that a contagion is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the disease, why does he describe such evidence as only establishing correlation, 
which he claims can be distinguished from causation with evidence from animal inoculation 
experiments?  Relatedly, why would Koch require that his causal proof involve experiments 
demonstrating disease in animal models when he knew some contagious diseases lacked such 
models? )ndependent of these interpretive issues, Koch’s postulates seem useful for some diseases, but 
of limited use for others. As often noted, they cannot establish causation for diseases with causes   
that cannot be isolated in pure culture, that are present in healthy carriers, and that have no known   
animal model.6  Furthermore, it is often claimed that the postulates represent a ǲmono-causalǳ 
model that fails to accommodate the causal complexity characteristic of many diseases.7 While discussions of Koch’s postulates often emphasize these limitations, they are also viewed   as an 
important guide and ǲstandardǳ for establishing causality (Fredericks and Relman 1996, 18). 
They are seen as establishing causality when they can be fulfilled and as a starting point for new 
and improved causal criteria when they cannot be.8  These discussions lead to the additional puzzle of how Koch’s postulates can be useful, yet not universal. )n this paper, we argue that Koch’s postulates are best understood within an interventionist 
account of causation, in the sense described in Woodward (2003). We describe how this interpretation is supported by Koch’s discussions of disease causation, the causal reasoning he 
employs, and important aspects of the historical context within which he conducted his work.  We view our paper as an effort at rational reconstruction; we attempt to show how Koch’s postulates 
and reasoning make sense and are normatively justified within an interventionist framework and 
more difficult to understand within alternative frameworks for thinking about causation. Our 
discussion proceeds as follows: in section two, we discuss the historical context surrounding Koch’s 
work and how it influenced his method of establishing disease causation. In section 3 we describe Woodward’s ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ interventionist account of causation and examine its relation to Koch’s animal 
inoculation experiments, which comprise the third postulate.   Section 4 discusses the relationship 
between interventionism and necessary and sufficient conceptions of causation in the context of understanding Koch’s work. Section 5 argues that the first and second postulates are best 
understood as assumptions about causal specificity, a notion which plays an important role in Koch’s causal reasoning.  Section 6 provides more details regarding Koch’s reasoning throughout 
his publications and how this is best understood with an interventionist framework. 
                                                             
6 (Smith Hughes 1977; Evans 1993).  
7  (Broadbent 2009).  
8 For examples of suggested modifications of Koch’s postulates, see: ȋFalkow ͳͻͺͺ; Evans ͳͻ͹͸; 
Fredericks and Relman 1996; Smith 2001). 
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2 Historical Background.  
2.1 19th Century theories of disease and contagia. In the early to mid-19th century, the 
European medical community remained significantly divided over the nature of disease causation. 
Some favored a miasmatic theory which maintained that diseases were caused by noxious airs or ǲmiasmataǳ that emanated from putrid or decaying substances (Smith Hughes 1977, 1). These 
miasmata were characterized as undetectable, immaterial, and capable of causing diseases that 
seemed to be highly contagious and transmitted by air. Explanations for seemingly communicable 
diseases often appealed to ǲmiasmatic influencesǳ in addition to other long lists of causal factors, 
including dietary excess, exposure to extremes of temperature, emotional disturbance, and even the 
transgression of moral or social norms (Carter 2003; Smith Hughes 1977). Different diseases were 
often explained by citing similar lists of causal factors and the diseases themselves were 
characterized by groups of overlapping symptoms. 
The miasmatic view contrasted with a contagionist theory of disease, which held that 
communicable diseases were caused by small material pathogens. The applicability of the 
contagionist theory to human disease was supported by evidence that certain plant and animal 
diseases were caused by microscopic contagia and that similar microscopic particles were present 
in some human diseases.9  Jacob Henle, a German anatomist and professor to Koch, was one of the 
earliest and most well-known supporters of the contagionist theory.  Although Henle favored this 
theory, he admitted that there was insufficient evidence to conclusively support it as an account of 
human disease (Henle 1961). Like most others at the time, he viewed the observation of an 
association between microscopic matter and disease as inconclusive evidence of a causal 
relationship, because it was consistent with the microscopic matter being a secondary effect of 
some alternative disease cause. In his 1840 book ǲOn Miasma and Contagia,ǳ Henle discussed this ǲmere associationǳ objection and specified a hypothetical experiment that could conclusively 
establish causality. He wrote: 
If it was possible with our present-day methods to solve the question of the nature of 
the contagium through direct observation, then the theoretical discussion which I have 
advanced as proof would be superfluous and unnecessary. Unfortunately it must be 
predicted that a right proof from positive observations is not yet possible, even if these 
observations were more favorable to our hypothesis than the current ones. If one finds 
living, moving animals or distinct plants in the infectious (contagious) material, it is 
quite possible that these could have developed incidentally when this material was 
exposed to air. And even if the animals or plants in this contagious material were 
always present within the body, there would still be the possible objection, and one hard 
to oppose, that they are only parasitic, although constant elements, which develop in 
the body fluids and are significant for the diagnosis of the disease, without being the 
causal material or the seeds of the causal material. In order to prove that they are really 
the causal material, it would be necessary to isolate the animal seeds and animal fluid, 
                                                             
9 For example, in 1835 Augostino Bassi provided evidence that muscardine disease of silkworms 
was fungal in origin and in 1839 Johann Lucas Schonlein discovered the parasitic fungus thought to be responsible for ǲ)mpetiginesǳ ȋBulloch ͳͻ͵ͺ, ͵ͻͷ; Smith (ughes ͳͻ͹͹, ʹȌ. 
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the contagious organism and contagious fluid, and then observe especially the power 
of each one of these to see if they corresponded. This is an experiment which cannot be 
performed (Brock 1999, 78; emphasis added). 
While Henle viewed the observed association between bacteria and disease as insufficient to 
establish causation, he described a hypothetical experiment that could. This experiment involved 
separating the candidate contagion from the infectious material of a diseased organism, so that the 
causal influence of each could be observed separately and then attributed to the proper substance. Although (enle stated that this experiment could not be performed, its similarity to Koch’s 
postulates has led many to claim that the postulates originated with (enle’s work, which is why 
they are sometimes called the ǲHenle-Koch postulatesǳ (Evans 1976). Like Henle, Koch was strongly 
influenced by the common objection that bacteria were merely associated with, and not causally 
relevant to, some diseases. 
The contagionist theory that Henle supported in 1840 was quickly overshadowed by the cellular 
pathology approach that would dominate German medicine until the 1870s (Ackerknecht 1953, 
105). This approach was popularized by Rudolph Virchow and viewed disease as a disturbance of 
internal cellular pathology and ultimately ǲa cell-based physiological process...where the 
constitution of the host played a dominant role in the manifestation of the diseaseǳ (Smith Hughes 
1977, 22). While cellular pathology was not in direct conflict with the contagionist theory, it was 
poorly suited to elucidate the role of bacteria in disease, because it prioritized internal pathological 
causes over external factors like bacteria (Ackerknecht 1953, 106; Gradmann 2009, 43). For some 
diseases, pathological disturbance was thought to precede the presence of pathogenic bacteria, so 
that the internal pathology was viewed as the primary cause of the condition. For other diseases, it 
was claimed that different bacteria resulted in the same cellular pathology, so the shared 
pathological disturbance was viewed as the main or significant cause of the disease (Mazumdar 
1995, 77). Cellular pathology would remain the focus of studies on disease causation until advances 
in botany, bacteriology, and animal experimentation would draw attention back to the contagionist 
approach. 
With increasing evidence that microscopic contagia were likely causes of certain plant and 
animal diseases, research into microscopic life forms was considered increasingly relevant to 
studies of disease causation. This early work in bacteriology grew out of botanical research, with 
early studies of single-celled algae and the classification of bacteria as microscopic plant forms 
(Mazumdar 1995). During this time botanical researchers strongly disagreed about whether 
bacterial organisms were capable of transforming into different types or remain fixed as 
unchanging species. The transformationist position was supported, most notably, by the Swiss 
botanist Carl von Nägeli and strongly opposed by the German botanist Ferdinard Cohn (Mazumdar 
1995, 42). Cohn proposed a Linnaean classification of bacteria, which divided them into fixed 
species similar to other plants and animals. The unresolved debate between transformationist and 
fixed-species views complicated attempts to clarify the relationship between bacteria and disease. 
If bacteria could cause disease, but also spontaneously transform between species, it was not clear 
how to study which bacterial ǲtypesǳ or ǲformsǳ were the cause of disease. Transformationist 
theories implied the impossibility of isolating and studying single bacterial species and meant that 
some diseases could be attributed to large groups of inter-transforming bacteria. 
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ʹ.ʹ Koch’s studies of disease causation. Koch began his work on disease causation in 1873 and 
published the majority of his work between 1876-1890 (Brock 1988; Gradmann 2009). While he 
would ultimately publish over 100 papers throughout his lifetime, 10 of these papers are typically 
the focus in analyses of his criteria of disease causation.10  These papers can be roughly divided into three groups, which chronologically track Koch’s work on anthrax, tuberculosis, and cholera, 
respectively. 11 
Koch began his work on disease causation at a time when there was widespread interest in 
controlling and preventing the devastating effects of various diseases and increasing support for the 
view that such diseases might have bacterial etiologies.  Within a scientific community that had an 
increased interest in bacterial causes, but polarizing disagreements about the fixed-species nature 
of bacteria, Koch’s work in this area began with a careful study of bacterial life forms  In his earliest 
work on anthrax, he created novel techniques for isolating, identifying, and visualizing bacteria. In 
the beginning of his first publication on disease causation, he describes how he used these 
techniques to identify a single fixed-bacterial species in anthracic animals–Bacillus anthracis–and 
how he traced the entire life-cycle of this bacilli, including its spore-forming stage, for the first time. 
This identification of a single bacterial species that is associated with a particular disease is 
characteristic of his approach toward establishing causality—it persists throughout his work on 
disease causation and is reflected in his first two postulates. He was likely motivated to focus on this 
as natural first step since it provided evidence of the presence and stability of a single microbial 
species in disease, at a time when both of these were questioned by his research community. 
However, while evidence of association between bacteria and disease was suggestive of 
causation, Koch viewed this evidence as insufficient to establish such a relation. In a manner similar to (enle’s hypothetical experiment, Koch conducted animal inoculation experiments with pure 
cultures of anthrax bacilli to establish that they were the cause of anthrax disease. He modified this 
experimental practice by identifying superior animal models and inoculation sites, developing 
sterile techniques, and advancing procedures for isolating pure cultures of bacteria. He used these 
techniques to demonstrate that inoculation of the anthrax bacilli ǲinvariablyǳ caused disease, while 
inoculation of bacilli-free controls did not, evidence which he viewed as providing ǲsufficient proof 
that the spores of Bacillus anthracis cause anthraxǳ (Koch 1987a, 12). This step is reflected in the 
third postulate, which involves isolating the contagion and inoculating it into an animal model to 
reproduce the disease of interest. In his later work on tuberculosis Koch uses the same isolation and 
inoculation steps, which he claims to have introduced in his anthrax research ȋKoch ͳͻͺ͹dȌ. Koch’s 
view that association is insufficient to establish causation and that inoculation experiments are 
highly important for such determinations can be seen in his 1884 work on tuberculosis. Koch 
writes: 
From my numerous observations, I conclude that these tubercle bacilli occur in all 
tuberculous disorders, and that they are distinguishable from all other 
microorganisms. From the simultaneous occurrence of tuberculous disorders and bacilli, 
                                                             
10 These 10 papers have been translated from German into English by K. Codell Carter (Koch 
1987a-g).  
11 In addition to these diseases, one of these papers examines the etiology of infectious wound 
diseases. 
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one cannot conclude that they are causally related...To prove that tuberculosis is caused 
by the invasion of bacilli, and that is a parasitic disease caused by the growth and 
multiplication of bacilli, it is necessary to isolate the bacilli from the body, to grow 
them in pure culture until they are freed from every disease product of the animal 
organism and, by introducing isolated bacilli into animals, to reproduce the same 
morbid condition..(Koch 1987d, 82, emphasis added) 
This passage suggests the importance Koch placed on his animal inoculation experiments, 
which he viewed as having a ǲgreat significanceǳ and as the ǲweighiest aspect of his proofǳ (Koch 
1987e, 141; Koch 1987b; 117). The importance Koch placed on this work makes sense when it is 
understood how he relied on such experiments to distinguish causal from correlational 
relationships. The role of these experiments in Koch’s postulates and the rationale behind their use 
are captured by the interventionist account of causation which we describe in the next section. 
3  The interventionist framework. 
͵.ͳ Interventionism and Koch’s third postulate. The basic idea of interventionism is that causal 
relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for manipulation and control: if you 
can intervene on C in such a way that changes in C are reliably associated with changes in E, then C 
causes E.  Conversely, if C causes E and appropriate interventions on C are possible, then these 
should be followed by changes in E.  (Woodward 2003). More specifically, we have the following 
necessary and sufficient condition for causation, where C and E are types of events: 
(M) C causes E if and only if (i) there is some possible intervention on C such that (ii) 
were this intervention to occur, there would be an association or correlation between 
C and E. 
A number of features of (M) require additional clarification. First, the notion of an intervention: 
this is explained in more detail below, but heuristically one may think of it as an idealized 
experimental manipulation of C which is appropriately unconfounded for the purposes of 
determining whether C causes E. In this context, a confounder can be understood as some 
additional causal factor C* that may be responsible for the presence of an association between C and 
E and that makes it look as though C causes E, even though it does not. The idea behind (M) is that 
the intervention gives C an independent causal history in a way that removes the potential 
confounding influence of other factors that might be responsible for the presence of an association 
between C and E. In particular, the intervention produces a change in C that is uncorrelated with 
such confounders, thus ensuring that if an association between C and E is present when the 
intervention on C occurs, that association can only be due to the causal influence of C on E. One 
motivation for (M) is that it captures the common sense methodological idea that an appropriately 
unconfounded experimental manipulation of C is an especially reliable way of determining whether 
C causes E. 
In the present context we are dealing with binary variables that represent whether some 
candidate cause C for some disease D, is present or absent and the effect is the disease itself, which 
will also either be present or absent. In this case, an intervention ǲonǳ C would involve introducing 
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C, in the uncorrelated or unconfounded manner described above, into some particular context. For 
example, this might involve introducing C into an animal’s blood system in which it was previously 
absent (i.e., changing its value from ǲabsentǳ to ǲpresentǳ) or removing it from a context in which it 
was previously present (changing its value from ǲpresentǳ to ǲabsentǳ). According to 
interventionism, C causes E if and only if such an intervention on C is associated with a change in 
the incidence of the disease, such as its presence or absence or the rate at which it occurs. )nterventionism fits Koch’s postulates in a straightforward way, particularly his emphasis in the 
third postulate on fully isolating the contagion, growing it in pure culture and showing that when it 
is appropriately introduced into a healthy animal, the animal exhibits the disease. As discussed in 
more detail below, isolation of the contagion and growing it in a pure culture are procedures for 
ensuring that the inoculation has the characteristics of an intervention. Both of these steps are 
aimed at excluding the possibility that the inoculated material contains confounding factors besides the candidate contagion that might cause the disease. Koch’s willingness to conclude that 
substances not followed by disease after repeated inoculation, do not in fact cause the disease, also 
fits naturally with the ǲonly ifǳ part of (M). 
Interventionism attempts to capture the idea that experimentation often has an epistemically 
privileged role in providing evidence for causal relationships. Here ǲexperimentationǳ refers to the 
use of a procedure in which factors or conditions are actually physically manipulated, as when a 
contagion is isolated through some physical procedure and then injected into an animal’s 
bloodstream. This contrasts with cases where evidence is ǲpurely observationalǳ in the sense that 
one merely observes patterns of association of factors in nature without physically manipulating 
those factors. An example involving ǲpurely observational evidenceǳ in the present context would 
be the observation that bacteria B are always found in animals that exhibit disease D or that 
whenever bacteria B are present the animal always exhibits disease D, but where there is no 
experimental manipulation of those bacteria. The limitation of such evidence in establishing 
causation is that the above observations do not exclude the possibility that some other factor that 
co-occurs with B is in fact the cause of D. Similar points are expressed by Henle, who stated that a 
causal proof could not be provided by ǲdirect observationǳ or ǲpositive observationǳ of the presence 
of contagia in cases of disease, since such evidence could not counter the objection that the contagia 
were mere secondary by-products of the disease ǲwithout being the causal materialǳ (Henle 1938; 
Brock 1999). This same sentiment is expressed by Koch in claiming that his demonstration of an 
association between tubercle bacilli and the disease, does not respond to the objection that ǲsome 
other substanceǳ was the cause of the disease (Koch 1987e, 141). From the interventionist 
perspective, a properly performed experiment can exclude this possibility and it is this idea that is 
reflected in (M).  
In saying that experimentation has a privileged role in establishing causation, we do not mean 
that one can never reach reliable causal conclusions from observational evidence or that 
conclusions from experiment are never mistaken. Instead, we mean that when experiments can be 
carried out they often furnish especially reliable evidence about the presence of causal 
relationships. In a purely observational context, if one knows that C* is or may be a confounder and 
one can detect or measure it, one may be able to correct or control for it via some calculational 
procedure. However, when there are many potential confounders and many of these are unknown 
or unmeasured or when one is working with a small sample of cases, it may be difficult or 
impossible to carry out the needed corrections to reliably eliminate confounders.   One of the great 
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advantages of experimentation is that, in many cases one needs to know less, often much less, for 
the elimination of confounders and reliable causal inference than when the inference is made on the 
basis of purely observational evidence.   
3.2 Structure of the interventionist condition for causation (M). The conditions in (M) have 
additional structure which is worth underscoring, since they also connect naturally with features of Koch’s experimental practice. The first clause (i) in (M) requires that there ǲexistǳ a possible 
intervention on the putative cause C or, more colloquially, that an intervention on C is possible. We 
will not try to provide a general characterization of what ǲpossibleǳ means here, but instead note 
the following points. First, since actuality implies possibility, one way of showing that an 
intervention is possible is to develop a technique for actually carrying out the intervention in 
question. In the present context this involves developing an experimental procedure for introducing 
C that is targeted or fine-grained in the sense that it allows one to introduce C into a situation in 
which C is not previously present, while not introducing other potentially confounding causal 
agents that might cause disease D. Of course, different candidate causes will require different 
intervention procedures, since distinct steps must be taken to isolate unique candidate pathogens 
and remove different types of confounders. It thus makes sense that Koch spends a great deal of 
time developing such individualized procedures for many of the microorganisms and diseases 
regarding which he makes causal claims.  
Second, (M) requires only that there be ǲsomeǳ possible intervention on C that is associated 
with changes in D, and not that all possible interventions on C have this upshot. Applied to his 
examples, this means that if Koch is guided by something like (M), to establish causation it is 
enough that he develop some intervention procedure for introducing the microorganism in an 
unconfounded way that is reliably associated with the occurrence of the disease. That there may be 
many other experimental procedures for introducing the microorganism into a test animal that are 
not reliably followed by the disease does not show that the microorganism does not cause the 
disease, as long as there is at least one such procedure that is followed by the disease. This explains 
why Koch does not conclude, from the failure to produce disease from feeding experiments, or 
procedures that introduced a pathogen into the digestive tract of an animal, that the pathogen does 
not cause the disease (Koch 1987a). Thus, it would be a mistake to take Koch to be committed to a 
version of ǲcausal sufficiencyǳ according to which if C causes D, just any way of introducing C into a 
test animal must be followed by D.  Moreover, it is in our view also a mistake to conclude, that if 
Koch does not make the inference just described, he must be committed to a ǲnecessary conditionǳ 
rather a ǲsufficient conditionǳ conception of causation. Carter relies on inferences of this sort in 
claiming that Koch did not rely on causal sufficiency in his early anthrax work, arguing that: ǲ[Koch] 
knew that the mere presence of anthrax bacilli in an animal did not ensure that it would become 
diseased; ingesting anthrax bacilli did not invariably induce anthrax (1.19), some inoculation 
procedures were unreliable (i.6), and even among exposed susceptible animals, vulnerability 
depended on various factors (i.213). So Koch could not claim that the bacilli alone were sufficient to 
cause anthraxǳ (Carter 1985; p. 356).  
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In contrast, we think that Koch (like most researchers) does not hold at any point in this work 
that if a contagion causes a disease, all inoculation procedures with that contagion will be followed 
by the disease—contagions should not be expected to be ǲsufficient conditionsǳ for diseases in this 
sense. Indeed, finding an intervention procedure that works in the sense of leading to the disease is 
non-trivial and something that in most cases needs to be discovered empirically on a trial and error 
basis. For example, Koch discovered empirically that inoculating the ears of mice was unsuccessful 
in producing anthrax, because the mice were able to ǲremove the inoculation material by rubbing 
and lickingǳ their ears (Koch 1987a, 3). He modified his technique by inoculating the mice at the 
base of their tails, which they could not reach, and found that such inoculations ǲalways have a 
positive resultǳ in leading to anthrax disease (Koch 1987a, 3). This illustrates that Koch regards it as 
sufficient to show that there exists an intervention procedure involving the contagion that leads 
regularly to the disease, even if this is not true for all intervention procedures.  
Because what matters is the existence of some intervention procedure that is followed by the 
disease, this has implications (since M provides a necessary, in addition to a sufficient condition for 
causation) for what would be required to show that a   candidate pathogen does not cause a disease. 
To establish this one would need instead to show that there is no possible intervention procedure 
with the candidate pathogen satisfying the requirements in (M) that regularly leads to the disease. 
As we will suggest below, Koch does rely on arguments of this form to establish that various 
candidate pathogens are not causes of a particular disease. For example, Koch claims to have 
established a conclusion of this sort for non-anthracic substances in the causation of anthrax–that 
is, he injects these substances, finds they do not lead to anthrax and concludes on this basis that 
they are not causes of anthrax (Koch 1987a, 11). As we discuss below, given other assumptions that 
Koch adopts, establishing negative conclusions of this sort is not as difficult as might initially be 
supposed. 
  Note also that the conditional in (M) is a counterfactual: a necessary and sufficient condition 
for C to cause E is there must be a possible intervention such that if it were carried out, a certain 
consequence would follow. (M) thus does not say that for C to cause E an intervention experiment 
on C must actually be carried out or that the only way we can establish that C causes E is by carrying 
out such an experiment. This allows for the possibility that it might be feasible to establish that the 
conditions in (M) are satisfied without actually carrying out an intervention on C. Assuming that 
Koch adopts an interventionist interpretation of causation, this in turn bears on the question of 
whether Koch required (or should have required), in order to establish causality, an animal model 
in which the disease is shown to follow from an appropriate inoculation with the contagion. Our 
view is that while finding such an animal model is regarded by Koch as a very clear way of 
establishing causation, he does not regard this as in principle the only way legitimate way of 
establishing causality. This is consistent with an interventionist framework: if one cannot perform 
an animal experiment to test for causation and moral considerations rule out experiments on 
humans, one can sometimes get evidence from other sources about what would happen if the 
disease were introduced via a suitable intervention without actually performing the intervention in 
question. One way this might be done is by finding some naturally occurring process that 
introduces the contagion and has intervention-like features, a so-called natural experiment. This is 
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essentially what Koch does in the case of cholera, as discussed in more detail in section 6 –he 
recognized that there was no animal model and yet claimed to have established causality by relying 
on evidence from cholera outbreaks in certain villages (Koch 1987f). 
This last observation connects with another point. An additional role played by (M) is that it can 
serve as regulative ideal in the following sense: if you want to understand what would be required 
to show that some factor C causes effect E, think about what would be involved in carrying out a 
hypothetical experiment in which C is manipulated, and what evidence would show that in such an 
experiment, E would change. As noted above, the usefulness of this way of thinking is seen in (enle’s description of a hypothetical experiment that, if it were possible to perform, would establish 
disease causation. This description played an important normative role in suggesting what sort of 
evidence, in addition to an association between a contagion and a disease is relevant to establishing 
causation and also may have played a role in leading Koch to devise procedures for actually 
performing experiments of the sort Henle described.    
4 Interventionism and necessary and sufficient conditions. In this section we discuss the 
relationship between interventionism and other familiar treatments of causation. Many discussions, like Carter’s treatment of Koch’s postulates, connect the notion of causation to the 
existence of regularities involving necessary and/or sufficient conditions.   This is a potent source 
of confusion because there are many different forms such a connection can take. It will be 
important for our discussion to distinguish between two of them. The first involves the idea that 
one can appeal to facts about regularities involving necessary and sufficient conditions to provide a 
reductive definition of causation. (Here ǲreductiveǳ implies that the regularities associated with 
causation are characterized in a way that does not presuppose unreduced modal notions like ǲcauseǳ,ǳ lawǳ etc.) For example, one might claim that ǲcausesǳ in ǲC causes Eǳ just means   
something like ǲcondition C is sufficient for Eǳ (in the sense that there is a regularity such that the 
occurrence of C is always followed by E), and/or that C is necessary for E (if C does not occur E does 
not occur), or perhaps that C is both necessary and sufficient for E. A more sophisticated variant of this idea is captured in J.L. Mackie’s well-known view that causes can be defined as INUS conditions 
(Mackie 1980). On this last view ǲcauseǳ is understood in terms of complicated combinations of 
facts about regularities involving necessary and sufficient conditions, more specifically, C causes E 
if C is a non-redundant (and in this sense ǲnecessaryǳ) conjunct in a condition that is sufficient for E. 
These are what we called necessary and sufficient condition conceptions of causation in section 1.  
           A second possible view holds that causation cannot be defined in terms of, or reduced to, 
claims about regularities involving necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead should be 
characterized in some other way--for example, in terms of (M)12.  However, it is consistent with this 
view that true causal claims–-true, for example, in the sense that they satisfy (M)--may be 
associated with certain regularities, where these regularities may vary, depending on the 
characteristics of the systems we are trying to understand.  On this view there are empirically based 
constraints involving regularities that pertain to how causes operate in various subject areas, but 
there is no implication that causes are definable in terms of such regularities and no implication 
that all causes in all areas of inquiry must operate in terms of these regularities. In our view, much of the discussion of Koch’s postulates in terms of ǲnecessary causes,ǳ or causes understood as 
                                                             
12 (M) is not reductive because the notion of an intervention is characterized in causal terms.  
12 
necessary conditions, versus ǲsufficient causes,ǳ or causes understood as sufficient conditions, does 
not distinguish clearly between the two possibilities just described. Koch’s own views about the 
role of considerations having to do with necessity and sufficiency seem much closer to this second 
possibility, which for future reference we call the empirical connection position.  
To take one of the simplest possible illustrations of this second position, suppose, in accordance with Koch’s third postulate, that: ȋKȌ a type of bacterium B can be isolated and that when it is 
properly injected into an animal host, a particular disease D always occurs. Suppose one regards the 
satisfaction of condition (K) as sufficient to establish that infection with B causes D. ǲSufficiencyǳ is 
involved in condition (K) in at least two ways: (4.1) first, fulfillment of (K) is taken to be sufficient in 
establishing that B causes D and (4.2) second, condition (K) requires that cause B itself be a 
sufficient cause in the sense that the proper introduction of B into the animal always leads to or is in 
the context ǲsufficient forǳ D. Note, however, that condition (K) does not in itself  imply that (4.3) if   
some factor X is always followed by Y (that is, X and Y are correlated, but it has not been shown that 
interventions on X are followed by Y), it follows that X is a cause of Y, which is what a definition or 
conception of cause in terms of a regularity involving a sufficient condition implies. This holds even 
if X is a microorganism that when found in an animal is always followed by disease Y. Not only does 
(4.3) does not follow from condition K, but (4.3) is clearly methodologically objectionable because, 
as observed above, it is insensitive to considerations regarding confounding. More generally (and 
for parallel reasons) there are compelling normative objections to any version of the idea that ǲcauseǳ can be defined in terms of claims about the obtaining of regularities involving necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions: all such views fail to distinguish between causation and correlation. Of 
course it does not follow just from the normative inadequacy of conceptions of causations framed in 
terms of regularities involving necessary and sufficient conditions that Koch did not hold such a conception. Nonetheless given Koch’s evident concern with ruling out confounding and the 
importance he attaches to intervention experiments, it would be surprising if he held a conception 
of causation which does not fit with this concern and which fails to distinguish causation and 
correlation.  Supposing Koch to be committed to an interventionist conception of causation makes 
much better sense of his reasoning and experimental procedures.   
 
5 The status of Koch’s first and second postulates. In this section we provide an analysis of Koch’s first and second postulates in terms of causal specificity assumptions, which we understand 
as empirical connection claims of the sort described in Section 4. We first describe these assumptions and then discuss their role in Koch’s causal reasoning. 
5.1 Causal specificity assumptions. If it is correct that Koch does not hold a conception according 
to which causation is just a matter of regularities involving necessary and sufficient conditions, what should we make of Koch’s first and second postulates? Recall that these say, respectively that: 
1. The contagion occurs in every case of the disease. 
2. The contagion does not occur in other diseases or non-pathogenically. 
Beginning with the first postulate, rather than taking it to involve a commitment to the claim that 
causation itself can be characterized in terms of the presence of a regularity in which the cause is a 
necessary condition for its effect, we suggest instead that it rests on an empirical claim about a kind 
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of specificity that we should expect in the causation of certain diseases, where the operative notion 
of cause is the interventionist one. In particular, the first postulate rests on something like the 
following specificity of cause assumption: 
(5.1) If a pathogen of type C is a cause of a disease of type D, according to the 
interventionist account of cause as described in (M), then the following claim will 
hold as a matter of empirical fact: causes of type C are the only pathogens that cause 
diseases of type D. 
Obviously if assumption (5.1Ȍ is correct, then it is sensible to adopt Koch’s first postulate: to count 
as a cause of a disease, evidence must be provided that the pathogen is present in every case of the 
disease. The second postulate, on the other hand, can be understood as resting on the following 
specificity of effect assumption: 
(5.2) If a pathogen of type C is a cause of a disease of type D, according to the 
interventionist account of cause as described in (M), then the following claim will hold as a matter of empirical fact: C’s do not cause any other disease of a different 
type D. 
 
Again, if assumption (5.2Ȍ holds, it makes sense to adopt Koch’s second postulate. Both ȋ5.1) and 
(5.2) are claims about what is often called causal specificity: that a given type of effect can only have 
one type of cause (specificity of cause) and/or that a given type of cause can only have one type of 
effect (specificity of effect).13 On this construal of Koch’s postulates, neither of these specificity 
claims follow from the notion of causation itself--they are not built into some definition of causation 
that Koch adopts. This is as it should be:  on any plausible conception of cause, including 
interventionism, it is possible both that an effect might have many causes and that a cause might 
have many different effects. We thus agree with the many commentators who argue for this point in connection with Koch’s postulates. (owever, we take Koch to be supposing that, although it is not 
part of the definition of cause that either causes or effects must be specific, it is also true, as a 
contingent empirical matter, that the specificity claims (5.1) and (5.2) hold for most or all of the 
particular diseases he investigates, even if they do not hold for all causes or even for all diseases. Of 
course, Koch is right that such assumptions hold for anthrax, cholera, tuberculosis and other 
common infectious diseases. Furthermore, given the historical context surrounding Koch’s work, it makes sense that he would rely on such causal specificity assumptions. Koch’s work provided 
crucial evidence for their being uniquely distinct bacterial species and his attention to single species 
in his research led him to identify diseases that well fit a mono-causal model and could be well 
classified as caused by a single type of bacteria. This approach resulted in a sort of ǲmutual 
definition,ǳ where diseases where defined through their bacterial contagions, and the contagions 
were often named for the disease they produced (Gradmann 2009, 84; Mazumdar 1995, 66, 68). 
Koch viewed this method as providing a decisive standard for ǲspecifying the boundariesǳ of some 
diseases, which had been unattainable with previous studies of disease causation.14 For these 
                                                             
13 For more discussion of causal specificity, see (Woodward 2010). 
14 For example, when Koch established that the tubercle bacilli caused tuberculosis, many 
previously distinct disease categories–military tuberculosis, caseous pneumonia, caseous 
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reasons, Koch’s is often viewed as committed to a strict ǲone-to-one monomorphic relationship of 
the disease and its [bacterial] organismǳ ȋMazumdar ͳͻͻͷ, ͹ͷȌ. Koch’s reliance on causal specificity 
assumptions also led him to focus on disease examples that provided the strongest argument 
against transformationist theories and that could be straightforwardly supported with 
experimental evidence at a time when significant skepticism surrounded contagionist views. 
As we   illustrate   below, the relevance of these causal specificity claims to Koch’s reasoning is 
that if they are true or reasonable to assume, then they make the problem of identifying pathogenic 
causes of various diseases much easier than it would otherwise be. To put the role of these 
assumptions in modern terms, they limit the space of alternative hypotheses about disease 
causation within which he needs to search and thus facilitate identification of the correct 
hypothesis.   To spell this out, we need to further clarify the specificity claims themselves. First, note 
that as we have interpreted them, both claims are relativized or restricted to more general 
categories in which the types of causes and effects fall. For example, (5.1) does not claim that 
diseases have only one type of cause simpliciter but rather that, within the general category of 
pathogens, each disease will have only one type of pathogen as its cause. Thus, (5.1) is consistent 
with the disease also having causes that are not pathogens–for example, occurrence of the disease might also be influenced by the state of the subject’s immune system. This is a reflection of the fact 
that Koch is searching among pathogens or contagions for the causes of various diseases, not trying 
to discover all possible causal factors influencing those diseases. Obviously this more restricted 
claim is much more likely to be true, at least for certain diseases, than the unrestricted claim. 
Similarly, (5.2) does not claim that each type of pathogen has only one type of effect, which would 
be absurd, but rather that it causes only one type of disease, rather than several different types of 
diseases. 
Carter (1985, p. 360) and other commentators such as Broadbent (2009, 303-4) and Kelly ȋʹͲͲͳ, ʹͳ; ʹͲͲ͹, ͻͷȌ attempt to interpret Koch’s second postulate as a sufficiency claim of some 
kind. We think this is because they understand Koch to be working with a conception of causation 
that is characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and since the second postulate 
is obviously not a necessity claim, it looks to them as though the only alternative is to interpret it as 
a sufficiency claim. However, the second postulate is not a sufficiency claim in any obvious sense–
there is nothing in the notion of a cause being sufficient for an effect that implies that it can have 
only one kind of effect. In particular, if the claim that a pathogen is causally sufficient for some 
disease means simply that the occurrence of the pathogen is regularly followed by the disease, 
which is the notion of sufficiency that seems to be assumed, there is no reason why a given type of 
pathogen cannot be causally sufficient for many different diseases, in contravention of the second 
postulate. Our interpretation of the second postulate as the assumption that a cause can only have 
one type of effect of some more general kind, as indicated in (5.2), says something very different 
from the claim that this cause is sufficient for its effect. 
Similarly, these authors interpret the first postulate as a necessity claim, which can be 
characterized as the claim that (5.3) a regularity holds that specifies that whenever disease D 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
bronchitis, and others–were merged into one disease category once it was realized that they were 
all caused by the same tubercle bacilli (Koch 1987d, 93). This is an instance of a more general 
strategy of re-defining cause and effect variables in such a way that they come closer to satisfying 
one-cause, one-effect requirements of specificity.  
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occurs, factor C is present. However, notice that this claim (5.3) is compatible with its also being 
true that a regularity holds that specifies that whenever D occurs, pathogen C*, which is different 
from C, is also present. In other words, an effect can have more than one ǲnecessary condition,ǳ in the sense of a condition that must be present if the effect is. Our interpretation of Koch’s first 
postulate as claim (5.1), rules out this possibility in the case of disease causation. Thus, saying that a 
type of cause is necessary for a type of effect in the regularity based sense under discussion is quite 
different from saying that that type of cause is the only cause (within some more general category 
for that type or effect), which is what claim (5.1) says. For these reasons among others, the 
construal of the first two postulates in terms of regularities involving necessary and sufficient 
conditions does not do a good job of capturing their content or how they are used in Koch’s 
reasoning. 
5.ʹ The role of Koch’s first and second postulates in his reasoning.   
The appeal of specificity assumptions like (5.1) and (5.2) is that when true they can be used to 
support and facilitate various inductive inferences about disease causation and that they limit the 
space of alternatives among which the investigator must chose.  Here are some illustrations. 
Suppose it is true, in accord with (5.1), that if some pathogen C causes disease D, then C is the only 
cause of D. Then, given a candidate cause, C* for D and the further plausible assumption that every 
disease has at least one cause, one can exclude the possibility that C* causes D just by finding some 
cases in which D occurs without C*, since such cases show that D must have some other cause 
distinct from C* and hence by (5.1) that no cases of D can be caused by C*. (As we note below, this seems to capture at least part of Koch’s reasoning in his anthrax papers.Ȍ Suppose, by way of 
contrast, that disease D can have lots of different causes. Then if one fails to find that C* is present in 
some cases in which D occurs, this does not exclude the possibility that C* causes D in other cases. 
Thus if it is possible that D has many causes, ruling out candidate causes as genuine causes of D is 
much more difficult than it would be if, in accord with Koch’s first postulate, D can have just one 
cause. 
Of course it is true that merely ruling out candidate causes for D does not by itself establish 
what does cause D. Moreover, as noted above, even if one if one finds some candidate cause C which 
is present whenever D occurs, this does not establish conclusively that C causes D, since there may 
be some other factor K which is also present whenever D occurs and which in fact causes D. This is 
why, normatively speaking, doing an intervention experiment in which one isolates C is so 
important. On the other hand, because Koch’s first postulate can be used to eliminate many 
alternative candidates for the cause of D, it certainly is very helpful in restricting the space of 
alternative possibilities among which one needs to search in looking for the cause of D. As argued 
above, given the first postulate, there is, strictly speaking, no need to do intervention experiments 
on some candidate cause C* as long as one has observed cases in which D occurs without C*. (Of 
course one might want to do such an experiment anyway, since a negative result for a range of 
attempted intervention procedures would provide additional support for the conclusion, in accord 
with the only if part of (M), that C* does not cause D.) We may also add that even though finding 
that some factor C is present whenever D occurs does not by itself show that C causes D, it does, within Koch’s framework, imply the following: That either C causes D or else C is always associated 
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with something–like K above–that causes D. This consideration also can facilitate identification of K, 
since one now knows to look for it in those contexts in which C also occurs. Turning next to Koch’s second postulate, it also plays a role in substantially restricting the space 
of alternative hypotheses among which one needs to search in finding the cause of a disease. 
Suppose one is interested in disease D. If one can establish (e.g. by means of an intervention 
experiment) that some candidate pathogen C* causes some disease D* distinct from D, then, in 
accord with the second postulate, one can rule out the possibility that C* also causes D, thus 
allowing attention to focus on the remaining possible candidates for the cause of D. 
Note also that both the first and second postulates also help considerably with issues having to 
do with confounding. A confounder for some candidate cause C is some other factor C* which is a 
potential cause for D. If one can either find some case in which D occurs without C* or some case in 
which C* causes some disease D* distinct from D, one can infer (in accord with Koch’s first and 
second postulates, respectively), that C* is not a cause of D. Thus even if C* is present in the 
investigative context, one does not have to worry about its being a confounder for C. 
These observations bear on another set of issues concerning Koch’s postulates. Modern commentators note that postulates are useful for some diseases ȋas evidenced by Koch’s 
discoveries) but of limited usefulness for others: Koch’s criteria serve as an important guide to 
identifying causal relationships in biomedicine, but also have a number of serious limitations and 
are unable to account for the causal etiologies of many medically recognized diseases. Our 
treatment of the postulates makes sense of both of these features. As contingent empirical 
assumptions about disease causation, the postulates hold for certain diseases and not others. Koch 
focused on a set of diseases for which these assumptions held and exploited this fact in the 
inferences he made. This is consistent with there also being many diseases for which these 
assumptions fail. By contrast, if the postulates are interpreted as describing features that are built 
into meaning of the concept of causation adopted by Koch, then it becomes much more puzzling 
how the postulates can be both useful and not universal. 
6 Some Additional Aspects of Koch’s Reasoning. With these observations in mind let us look 
at some additional details of Koch’s reasoning. As we noted above, Carter claims that early in his 
work on anthrax Koch adopted a necessary condition criterion and/or conception of causation, only 
later shifting to a necessary and sufficient condition conception (Carter 1985; Carter 1987a). In 
contrast, we interpret Koch as making use of all three of his postulates and as holding an 
interventionist conception of cause throughout his work. In this section, we discuss features of Koch’s method of establishing causality throughout his early publications on anthrax, mid-career 
papers on tuberculosis, and later work on cholera. 
6.1 Anthrax (1876, 1881, 1882). Koch begins his 1876 paper with references to work by Casimir 
Davaine, a French physician who used inoculation experiments in studying anthrax and the small ǲrodsǳ identified the blood of anthracic animals. Koch states that in Davine’s research with ǲnumerous inoculation tests with fresh or dried blood containing these rods, he asserted that the rods 
were bacteria and that the disease could occur only when these rods from anthrax blood were 
presentǳ (Koch 1987a, 2; emphasis added). Koch mentions Davine’s work, because although it was considered the best evidence that anthrax bacilli caused anthrax, Davine’s claims had been 
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ǲcontradicted from several sidesǳ (Koch 1987a, 1). Davine could not account for two serious 
objections: (6.1.1) why the disease was often transmitted in barren, insect-free pastures that were 
presumably hostile to living contagions and (6.1.2) how anthrax was produced in animals 
inoculated with bacilli-free blood. These shortcomings led many scientists to deny that the bacteria 
were causally implicated in anthrax or that they were ǲsignificantǳ for the disease in any way (Koch 
1987a). 
Koch addressed the first objection by demonstrating that the anthrax bacilli gave rise to 
resistant spores that could withstand harsh environmental conditions without requiring an animal 
vector.15 He demonstrated that, after surviving such conditions, the spores could produce viable 
anthrax bacilli. The identification of anthrax spores also allowed Koch to respond to the second 
objection. The fact that prior researchers found animal inoculation experiments with bacilli-free 
blood to produce anthrax could be explained by the fact that such inoculations were contaminated 
by unidentified anthrax spores.  The unidentified spores produced anthrax bacilli which ultimately 
caused the disease. Koch conducted numerous inoculation experiments with anthrax spores and 
bacilli to substantiate this claim and to ǲproveǳ that these anthracic substances caused the anthrax disease. The following passage from Koch’s paper reveals important features of his experiments and 
argument for causation:   
It has been claimed that the disease caused by inoculation with anthrax blood is 
identical with septicemia. This claim could be taken as an objection to my inoculations 
with decaying anthrax substances. To refute this objection, I frequently inoculated 
mice with decaying blood from healthy animals and with decaying aqueous humor and 
vitreous humor that was free from bacilli. These animals nearly always remained 
healthy. …. Moreover, I also inoculated animals with decaying vitreous humor in which 
a species of bacillus had spontaneously developed that was very similar to Bacillus 
anthracis. The spores of the two species could not be distinguished by size or 
appearance, but the filaments of the vitreous humor bacilli were shorter and more 
clearly articulated. In spite of numerous attempts, my inoculations with these bacilli 
and with their spores never caused anthrax. Animals also remained healthy after 
inoculation with spores of hay-infusion bacilli cultured by Professor Cohn. On the other 
hand, I often inoculated with spores masses that had been cultured in vitreous humor and 
that, as I had convinced myself by microscopic examination, were derived from entirely 
pure cultures of Bacillus anthracis. The inoculated animals invariably died of anthrax. It 
follows that only one species of bacilli can generate this specific disease. Other inoculated 
schizophytes are either harmless or cause a completely different disease process. … 
This last experiment is sufficient proof that spores of Bacillus anthracis cause anthrax 
when introduced directly into body fluids (Koch 1987a, 12; emphasis added). 
Carter claims that this and other passages indicate that Koch was primarily interested in 
establishing that the bacilli were necessary for anthrax, and that Koch himself states his argument 
                                                             
15 Koch’s elucidation of the spore-forming life cycle of Bacillus anthracis significantly influenced the 
advancement of bacteriology through the development of important techniques, (e.g. hanging-
drop method, pure culture and sterile techniques) and support for the fixed species conception of 
microorganisms. 
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in this way. Carter notes that Koch attempted to generate anthrax by inoculating hay-infusion 
bacilli, anthracic materials without bacilli, and look-alike non-anthrax bacilli. However, Carter 
claims that since these inoculations failed to produce anthrax, Koch concluded that anthrax could only be produced if bacilli or spores were present. )n discussing Koch’s successful inoculations with 
anthracic material, Carter claims that ǲKoch infers that bacilli cause anthrax from the observation 
that anthrax occurs only if injected substances contain bacilli or spores. Thus, he is presupposing 
necessity as the criterion for identifying the cause of anthrax. Here, and in other passages, Koch 
clearly regards necessity as decisive in establishing causalityǳ (Carter 1985). Carter also understands Davaine’s argument, as ǲan argument for causal necessity,ǳ because he claimed to 
always find the bacilli in the blood of anthracic animals and that bacilli-free inoculations never 
produced the disease (Carter 1985, 355). 
The italicized passages make it clear that Davaine performed inoculation experiments in which 
rods associated with anthrax disease were injected into test animals, and that Koch performed such 
experiments in which isolated anthrax bacilli and spores were injected into the blood systems of test animals, and that in both cases these animals died of anthrax. Koch’s discussion of his own 
work in this paper is clearly a description of an intervention experiment in which he takes himself 
to have established that anthrax spores cause anthrax, not just by observing that they are necessary 
for anthrax, but by demonstrating that appropriately introducing them is always or ǲinvariablyǳ 
followed by anthrax. However, instead of inoculating whole blood contaminated with anthracic 
materials as Davaine and prior researchers had done, Koch inoculated ǲpure culturesǳ of anthrax 
bacilli and spores. This allowed him to attribute the ensuing anthrax disease to these anthracic 
materials, as opposed to other candidate causes that might be injected with the whole blood. He 
explicitly states that these inoculation experiments, which always result in the disease, provide ǲsufficient proofǳ that the anthrax spores cause the disease. Here he seems to be reasoning in accord 
with the sufficiency clause of (M) and his third postulate. 
It is also true, as the quotations above make clear, that Koch attaches a great deal of importance 
to the fact that the injection of other kinds of bacilli and non-anthracic substances associated with 
anthrax, do not lead to the disease. However, it seems to us that the most natural way of 
interpreting these passages is that they reflect a concern with isolating the cause of anthrax and 
ruling out potential confounding factors–that is, Koch is concerned to ensure that the introduction 
of the spores and bacilli meets the conditions for an intervention. For example, one possibility is 
that some substance in the blood or tissues of anthracic animals, other than the anthrax bacilli or 
spores, might be the true cause of the disease with the bacillus and spores just being accidental 
concomitants or confounding factors. Showing that inoculations with these non-anthracic 
substances do not lead to the disease rules out this possibility in accord with the necessity clause of 
(M). Similarly, showing that inoculations (with various inoculation procedures) with non-anthracic 
bacilli do not produce the disease rules out the possibility that they cause anthrax, which also 
increases the plausibility of the claim that some other bacterium must be the cause, via a sort of 
eliminative argument. The observation that injection of various other bacteria, when not harmless, 
causes some other disease also supports the conclusion that these other bacteria cannot also be causes of anthrax via Koch’s second postulate that claims that each specific type of bacterium 
causes a specific disease, so that if a bacterium causes a disease distinct from anthrax it cannot also 
cause anthrax. 
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6.2 Tuberculosis (1882, 1883, 1884). When Koch began his work on tuberculosis it was the 
leading cause of death among all age groups16 and, despite painstaking efforts, ongoing research 
was unable to identify its causal etiology.  Koch’s research provided the first identification of the 
tubercle bacilli (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) and established its causal relationship to tuberculosis, 
research that would win him the 1905 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. In his publications on 
tuberculosis Koch claims to rely on the same procedure he used to clarify the etiology of anthrax. In 
re-describing his anthrax work to illustrate this procedure, he writes: ǲThis procedure, which 
proved the parasitic nature of anthrax, and the consequences that necessarily followed from results 
obtained in this way were the basis for my investigations of the etiology of tuberculosis. Thus, these 
investigations involved, first, demonstrating the pathogenic organisms, then isolating them, and 
finally reinoculating themǳ ȋKoch ͳͻͺ͹e, ͳ͵ʹȌ. Koch’s investigation into the etiology of tuberculosis 
was facilitated by his use of a new staining technique that allowed him to identify a previously 
unknown bacterium that was regularly associated with tuberculosis. He discusses how this 
association was an important first step in this procedure, but that this alone was unable to establish 
causation, which required the use of inoculation experiments. After describing specific features of 
the tubercle bacilli and their regular presence in tuberculous processes, Koch further clarifies his 
method of establishing causation: 
Up to this point, I have proved that tubercle bacilli are present in all tuberculous 
processes and only in such processes. I have also shown that only substances containing 
tubercle bacilli can generate tuberculosis. However, in both cases the bacilli were 
associated with other body constituents. One could still suspect that some other 
substance was the actual infectious material, and that the bacilli played only a secondary 
role. This question can only be decided by inoculating pure bacilli. They must be 
separated from all other body constituents. If they still cause tuberculosis, they are the 
single and unquestionable infection material. The great significance of precisely this 
part of the investigation requires the strictest measure to preclude all errors (Koch 
1987e, 141; emphasis added). 
In his first paper on tuberculosis, Koch describes his results from thirteen different inoculation 
experiments with around 10 different species of animals and varying tuberculosis sources. In each 
experiment he inoculated a subset of the animals with pure cultures of tuberculous materials, while 
the other animals served as controls, either uninoculated or inoculated with material other than 
tubercle bacilli. In order to ensure that the tubercle bacilli were in pure culture and completely 
separated from all other body constituents, Koch grew the bacilli in simple artificial media for 
extended periods of time (in one experiment, up to 113 days), with constant transfers to fresh 
media. As he states: ǲIn these experiments, many animals received the bacilli in different ways–through 
simple inoculation in the subcutaneous tissues, through injection into the abdominal 
cavity, into the anterior chamber of the eye, or directly into the blood stream. Without 
exception, they all became tuberculous. Not only were nodules formed, but the number 
of tubercles was in proportion to the number of bacilli introduced...Second, the control 
                                                             
16 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/608235/tuberculosis-TB (britannica) 
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animals remained healthy; they were treated exactly like the infected animals, the only 
difference was that they received no bacilli. Third, for other purposes, numerous 
guinea pigs and rabbits were also inoculated and injected with other substances. 
Typical military tuberculous never occurred among them. This can happen only when 
the body is suddenly overwhelmed by a large number of infecting germs. All these 
facts, taken together, show that the bacilli in tuberculous substances are not merely 
coincidental with tuberculosis, but cause it. These bacilli are the real tuberculosis 
virusǳ (Koch 1987d, 93). As seen in these passages, Koch’s method of establishing the causal etiology of tuberculosis 
follows the methodology of his anthrax experiments, just as he claims. His first and second 
postulates are captured by the initial steps of identifying a ǲcharacteristicǳ bacterium that is 
associated with all cases of a particular disease, and only this particular disease. We view these 
steps as relying on the assumptions of causal specificity, as outlined in section 5. If these 
assumptions are correct, (at least for some diseases) then identifying one-to-one associations 
between a specific contagion and disease provide a tractable and reliable place to look for causal 
relationships. Koch clearly views evidence of such associations as identifying promising candidates 
for causal relationships, but as unable establish causation alone. Koch does not view the 
simultaneous occurrence of the bacteria and disease, or even the fact that the disease can only be 
produced by inoculation with material containing the bacilli (and other potential causes), as 
establishing causation, because such information cannot rule out alternative causes, or 
confounders, that are also present with the tubercle bacilli. 
Koch states that determining whether the bacilli and disease stand in a causal relation ǲcan only 
be decided by inoculating pure bacilli,ǳ which is the final step of his procedure. Koch conducts this 
final step with 13 animal inoculation experiments, where he demonstrates that inoculation with 
pure cultures of tubercle bacilli always produces tuberculosis, while control animals remain 
disease-free. Koch’s experiments are paradigmatic interventionist experiments: they involve an 
unconfounded manipulation of the candidate bacterial cause, to establish its relation to the disease 
effect of interest. Koch ensures this with the extreme measures he takes to completely isolate the 
tubercle bacilli, so that only they are inoculated into animals, and so that control animals are 
treated exactly the same where the ǲonly difference was that they received no bacilliǳ (Koch 1987d, 
93). An interventionist interpretation captures Koch’s emphasis on the significance of his 
inoculation experiments, because they clarify how such experiments distinguish between mere 
association and causation. It is unclear why Koch would place so much importance on such a 
sophisticated experimental procedure, or include animal experiments at all, if he maintained a 
conception of causation according to which it is just a matter of regularities involving necessary and 
sufficient conditions, which can be identified by observation alone.   
6.3 Cholera (1884, 1884) Koch’s publications on cholera provide insight into the role of animal 
inoculation experiments in his method of establishing causality. This is, in part, due to the fact that 
there was no available animal model for cholera at the time of his research.  Similarly, to his prior 
work, Koch begins his 1884 cholera paper by describing the identification of a particular bacteria, in 
this case the ǲcomma bacilli,ǳ that he states are found in all cases of cholera and only in such cases 
(Koch 1987f, 157, 159). In discussing how to clarify the relationship between the bacteria and 
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disease, Koch states that ǲ[t]he only possibility of providing a direct proof that comma bacilli cause 
cholera is by animal experimentsǳ and that ǲ[o]ne should show that cholera can be generated 
experimentally by comma bacilli,ǳ statements that reflect his third postulate (Koch 1987f, 160). 
However, after failed attempts to infect various types of animals (including monkeys, cats, chickens, 
dogs, etc.) with the bacteria, Koch concludes that animal experiments cannot yet be provided, as ǲall 
the animals available for experimentation and those that often come into contact with people are 
totally immuneǳ (Koch 1987f, 161). 
From these findings, Koch decides that ǲwe must dispense with this part of the proof,ǳ17 but that ǲ[t]his certainly does not mean that there is no proof that comma bacilli are pathogenicǳ (Koch 
1987f, 161). Koch provides two reasons supporting the claim that comma bacilli cause cholera. 
First, he claims that an ǲargument by analogy is fully justified here,ǳ because recent evidence has 
definitely established that some infectious diseases have bacterial causes, and it is reasonable to 
assume that cholera is just like these diseases. He also mentions diseases like leprosy that were 
understood to be bacterial in origin, but that also lacked animal models, indicating that the lack of 
an animal model did not commit one to denying a bacterial etiology. Second, Koch supports the 
bacterial etiology of cholera by appealing to natural experiments in the human population. (For our 
purposes, a natural experiment involves the natural, unplanned occurrence of an intervention-like 
process that introduces or removes a candidate cause.) He describes cholera outbreaks that are 
traced to large amounts of comma bacilli, ǲusually in a nearly pure culture,ǳ in the laundry of those 
infected with cholera, where these cholera outbreaks can be ǲcan be conceived as experiments 
conducted under natural conditionsǳ (Koch 1987f, 161-162). These outbreaks include a 
community-wide cholera epidemic after a cholera victim washed laundry in the shared water 
supply and the high incidence of the disease among laundry personnel. Since these cholera samples 
are close to being a pure culture, Koch claims that ǲif an infection comes about through cholera 
laundry, it can only have happened because of these organisms. Suppose that laundry personnel 
become ill after eating with contaminated hands or that they are sprayed with laundry water that 
contains the bacilli and that a few drops reach their lips. These conditions simulate an experiment 
in which small quantities of pure cultures are fed to humans. These persons unknowingly perform 
experiments, on themselves and the experiments are as conclusive as if they have been intentional. 
Moreover, these observations are so common and have been made by so many different physicians 
that there can be no doubt about their reliabilityǳ (Koch 1987f, 161-2).  Koch claims that these 
natural experiments are ǲas conclusive as experiments on humansǳ and that they establish that the 
comma bacilli cause cholera (Koch 1987f, 161).  
Some have argued that in his cholera publications Koch relies on yet another distinct set of 
causal criteria that differ from the criteria he employs in his earlier work (Carter 1985). It is 
suggested that Koch perhaps omits his third postulate from his causal criteria in the case of cholera, 
realizing that it cannot be fulfilled in cases where animal models are unavailable. However, the 
claim that he revised his postulates in this manner is undermined by the fact that he continues to 
emphasize the role of animal inoculation experiments in his cholera papers, in other papers 
published in the same year, and also in his later work (Koch 1987g). Rather than reading Koch as 
completely eliminating his third postulate in his cholera publications, we understand him as 
claiming that in cases in which no animal model is available other forms of evidence can provide 
                                                             
17 Another translation of this is ǲWe must, therefore, waive this evidenceǳ ȋKoch ͳͺͺͶ, ͵͹Ȍ. 
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evidence for a causal relationship. These claims support our view that Koch regarded animal 
inoculation experiments as a reliable method of establishing causality, without regarding them as 
the only method capable of establishing causality.  
 
7.  Conclusion: Koch’s postulates throughout his work. We have argued that Koch’s 
postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causation. Koch claims that 
to establish that a contagion is the cause of a particular disease involves providing evidence that 
inoculating the contagion, and only the contagion, into a laboratory animal would reliably 
produce the disease in question. We have suggested that these inoculation experiments are 
straightforwardly understood within an interventionist framework: they establish the existence 
of a causal relationship by showing that the unconfounded experimental manipulation of the 
candidate cause is followed by the effect of interest.  The role Koch assigns to these experiments 
makes sense given their ability to distinguish causal relationships from mere correlations, and 
the fact that identifying methods that could reliably make this distinction was one of the 
dominant interests and concerns of his research community. Our interpretation of Koch’s postulates treats them as a fairly consistent method that he relies 
on throughout his work. We view this as an advantage of our account, because it is supported by Koch’s discussions of his own work. Koch claims that he relies on the same method 
throughout his work and that he first introduced this method in his earliest anthrax 
publications (Koch 1987e, 132).   It is true that Koch’s tuberculosis papers contain some of his 
most explicit descriptions of his causal criteria. This presumably explains why many scholars claim that Koch’s postulates first appear in his tuberculosis publications18.   However, while Koch’s tuberculosis publications are important for various reasons, we do not view them as 
containing the first discussion of his causal criteria.    
In addition, our analysis interprets Koch’s first two postulates as involving causal specificity 
assumptions. These assumptions apply to particular diseases that have a single main causal 
factor (specificity of cause) and where this factor is capable of producing a single disease 
(specificity of effect). With respect to modern biomedicine, it is clear that these assumptions are 
not universally applicable to all human diseases. However, they do hold for nearly all of the 
diseases that Koch and his contemporaries examined. For the diseases and causal factors that 
meet these specificity assumptions, Koch’s postulates are an incredibly powerful method of 
establishing causation. At a time when many scientists fervently denied that microorganisms 
could cause disease, this method was instrumental in substantiating germ theory and reshaping 
mainstream views on disease causation. Appreciating how this historical context influenced Koch’s criteria and understanding the assumptions that they depend on, clarifies how Koch’s 
postulates provide a useful, yet not universal, criteria of disease causation. 
Finally, we think that our interpretation of Koch illustrates a way in which an improved 
                                                             
18 Another potential reason for this is that Koch’s research on tuberculosis has received significant 
attention due to its relevance for controlling a common human disease, and this attention may encourage 
a tendency to view his tuberculosis work as importantly distinct from his prior research. 
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philosophical treatment of causation can lead to an enhanced understanding of various aspects 
of experimental practice in science.  Features of Koch’s experimental practice that previously 
were not well understood can be illuminated by viewing them through the lens of an 
interventionist account of causation. We believe that this account provides resources for the 
reconstruction of other important episodes in experimental science, but this is a topic for 
another paper.  
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